

THE HOSTAGE TRIAD: TAKERS, VICTIMS, AND NEGOTIATORS

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ABSTRACT

Hostage taking is an event with three groups of participants. It involves the hostage taker, the hostage, and some third person or entity. Usually, the hostage has no value for the hostage taker except as a tool to influence or gain the attention of the third person. Apparently, the hostage taker has the upper hand. The hostage taker creates a crisis and either demands are met or the hostages are killed. In some ways hostage taking is analogous to theater, but a theater of terror instead of amusement. The hostage taker is the star, the hostages the supporting cast, and the public and law enforcement the audience. Another way to conceptualize hostage taking is to understand it as an attempt by the hostage taker to solve a problem. Thus, hostage taking is a behavior designed by the captor in an effort to meet the captors needs, whether instrumental or expressive. This childlike simplicity colors all hostage incidents and marks hostage taking as the ultimate narcissistic act. Although hostage taking has a history as old as humankind, there has been little systematic study of hostage incidents. The present chapter reviews the literature regarding hostage taker typologies and proposes 6 general categories: (a) Emotionally Disturbed; (b) Political Extremists; (c) Religious Fanatics; (d) Criminals; (e) Prison Inmates; and (f) Combination. Furthermore, an examination of the statistical information related to hostage incidents accessible in the public domain is provided; the literature regarding the dynamics, phases, and negotiator techniques related to a hostage event is discussed, and an analysis of the hostage experience, both before and after the event, is presented.

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Introduction

To many, hostage taking is a new and shocking phenomenon, something that has developed in the last quarter of the 20th century. In truth, hostage taking has a history as old as humankind. In Greek mythology, there is perhaps the first documented use of a hostage negotiator and of the Stockholm Syndrome (Rahe, Karson, Howard, Rubin, & Poland, 1990). Persephone, daughter of the goddess Demeter, was kidnapped by Hades, king of the underworld. Intense and lengthy negotiations ensued involving the Greek state and Olympian deities. Demeter, in her anger, caused all the crops on Earth to die. This forced Zeus to send Eros as his “hostage negotiator” to seek a compromise with Hades. Following the negotiations, Hades allowed Persephone to return to Earth once a year, during the Spring. Demeter relented and permitted Earth’s crops to grow when Persephone returned but then caused them to die in the Fall when her daughter reentered the underworld. The hostage, Persephone, at first rejected Hades’ advances, but later came to love and marry him (Hamilton, 1942), thus reacting similarly to the more recent female hostage who divorced her husband to marry Jan-Erik Olsson, the Swedish bank robber who held her and three others hostage for 131 hours in the vault of Sveriges Kreditbank in Stockholm, Sweden in August 1973 (Strentz, 1980).

Human history is replete with other examples of hostage taking. The Romans regularly exchanged hostages with other nations as part of treaties to ensure that each party would fulfill their obligations. In the Middle Ages, soldiers took hostages to sell for ransom. A notable example is the English king, Richard Coeur-de-Lion, who was captured and held hostage for ransom by Emperor Henry VI on his way home from the third Crusade (Montgomery, 1983). Other famous hostages of that era were Joan of Arc and Miguel de Cervantes. As late as the 17th century, there existed Christian religious orders, such as the Mercedarians and Trinitarians, which were dedicated to the

rescue of hostages held as slaves in Islamic countries surrounding the Mediterranean Sea (Allondi, 1994).

Sea pirates as well as renegade governments have captured and used hostages to obtain money or goods from those third parties who valued the hostages' lives. From 1801 through 1805, the United States employed its most powerful warships, including the heavy frigates *President*, 44; *Philadelphia*, 36; *Constellation*, 36; *Chesapeake*, 36; and the *Constitution*, 44 in the War with Tripoli. This war was fought, in part, to stop hostage taking on the part of Yseuf Karamanli, Pasha of Tripoli. Interestingly, the war ended on June 3, 1805, when the United States agreed to pay \$60,000 for the release of American hostages and to evacuate the captured city of Derna, and Tripoli agreed to waive all claims to future tribute (Sweetman, 1984).

Air piracy began with the advent of air travel. One of the first documented "skyjackings" took place in Peru in the early 1930s (Phillips, 1973). A group of revolutionaries took command of a plane and dropped leaflets promoting its cause. At the time, the event received little media attention. Skyjackings began to catch the public's eye in the late 1940s when armed individuals began to capture eastern bloc airplanes in an effort to escape to the west. There were approximately 15 successful attempts over a three-year period, with the hostage takers forcing the captured planes to land in the American zone in West Germany. These hostage takers were hailed as freedom fighters and heroes rather than criminals or crazed terrorists (Phillips).

There were 32 skyjackings between 1948 and 1960 (Head, 1990). Not one plane captured was American. Then in May of 1961 an armed man forced a National Airlines' plane to fly from the U.S. to Castro's Cuba. The western public did not perceive this hostage taker a hero, nor the ones that followed. Skyjackings increased over the next decade, culminating in the dramatic capture of four planes over a three day period by Arab terrorists in September 1970. By January 1973 the U.S. government required all passengers on U.S. airlines be screened for weapons and explosives.

Most writers in the area of hostage taking and hostage negotiations mark 1972 as the watershed year in the modern history of hostage incidents. In March of that year Palestinian terrorists took hostage eleven Israeli athletes participating in the 1972 Olympic Games in Munich. The terrorists' demands were refused and the Munich police opened fire. An hour and a half later twenty two people were dead, a policeman, ten terrorists, and all the hostages (Soskis & Van Zandt, 1986).

Following this incident the governments and police forces of much of the western world began to reconsider policy. For example, by January 1973 the New York City Police Department had in place a Hostage Recovery Program which included not only special weapon and action teams but also police detectives trained as hostage negotiators (Bolz & Hershey, 1979; Schlossberg, 1980). The success of police psychologist, Harvey Schlossberg, and police captain, Frank Bolz, in designing and managing this program garnered the interest of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The FBI, following Schlossberg's and Bolz's lead, developed the Special Operations and Research Unit (SOARU), based at the FBI Academy located in the wooded hills of northern Virginia, southwest of Washington, D.C. Members of this unit are responsible for research and the training of FBI negotiators (Soskis & Van Zandt, 1986). Each FBI field office has at least one special agent trained as a negotiator. Special Operations and Research Unit (SOARU) personnel likewise provide negotiation schools for state and local law enforcement agencies as well as work with the fifty-one member Hostage Rescue Team, also based at the Academy (Kessler, 1993).

Since 1973 the use of trained personnel designated as hostage negotiators has steadily increased in the United States. In 1989 a survey of all state police (n = 50), large municipal police agencies (n = 191), and a random sample of each state's small municipal agencies (n = 1169) was initiated. Of the law enforcement agencies that responded, 68% (17) of the state police agencies,

96% (125) of the large municipal agencies, and 30% (158) of the small municipal law enforcement agencies had a designated negotiator (Butler, Leitenberg & Fuselier, 1993).

Hostage taking is a diverse and inadequately studied phenomenon. Hostage takers may act alone or in groups. There may be one hostage, such as Patty Hearst, or hundreds. There were 450 hostages in the October 3, 1985 *Achille Lauro* incident and approximately 350 hostages in the September 5, 1986 Pan Am Flight 73 incident (McDuff, 1992). The motivations of hostage takers can vary, ranging from the trapped criminal to the political terrorist to the emotionally disturbed husband holding a weapon to his wife's head. Thus the hostages may or may not be personally known to the hostage taker. Also the location of the hostages may or may not be known to law enforcement. Furthermore, hostage incident locations can be mobile such as an airplane, train, bus, or ship, or stationary as in a barricade situation. Hostage incidents may be of short duration, spanning only a few hours (sixteen hours in the case of the "Munich Massacre"), to situations that last for weeks, months, or even years (444 days in the case of the U.S. embassy hostages held in Iran). Finally, although most people think of hostages as being people, there are many incidents of property being held hostage such as the 1971 seizure of the Statue of Liberty by the Vietnam Veterans Against the War.

There has been little systematic study of hostage incidents with almost all scholarly articles focusing on anecdotal information and/or developing concepts based on personal experiences (Fuselier, 1988). Thus, a primary goal of this chapter is, for the first time, to compile and present in one place a summary of all, or almost all, statistical information related to hostage incidents accessible in the public domain. Frankly, this endeavor has been made manageable by the fact that there is so little information available. Besides the presentation and analyses of the statistical research, the literature regarding hostage taker typology, the dynamics, phases, and negotiator

techniques related to a hostage event, as well as an analysis of the hostage experience, both during and after the event, is presented.

The Hostage Taker

Hostage taking is a triadic event (Soskis & Van Zandt, 1986). It involves the hostage taker, the hostage, and some third person or entity. Typically, the hostage has no value for the hostage taker except as a tool to influence or gain the attention of the third person (Schlossberg, 1980). What types of people take hostages? This question and its answer are a logical beginning place in developing an understanding of the hostage taking incident.

When exploring this question, one notes that most authors focus in some way on the hostage taker's motivation. Miron and Goldstein (1979) wrote that hostage takers can be categorized as having one of two motivating purposes. They term these as either instrumental or expressive. Instrumental hostage taking occurs when the hostage taker is attempting to achieve a goal or change some aspect of society. Expressive hostage taking is motivated by internal emotions and impulses which are often quite personal and obscure. Wesselius and DeSarno (1983) note that probably most hostage takers have mixed instrumental and expressive motivations.

Strentz (1986) wrote that there are five types of hostage takers in the United States: the anti-social personality disorder, the inadequate personality disorder, the psychotically depressed, the paranoid schizophrenic, and the political assassin motivated by political-religious ideology. Hacker (1976) made note of three types: the crusader, the criminal, and the crazies. The crusader is that individual motivated by political-religious ideology. Crazies are people who are emotionally disturbed. Middendorf (1975) also noted three categories of hostage takers: political, escape, and personal gain. Cooper (1981) enumerated six categories. These are political extremists, fleeing criminals, institutionalized persons, wronged persons, religious fanatics, and the mentally disturbed

person. Kobetz (1975) enumerated five types. These are prison takeovers and/or escape attempts, aircraft hijackings, seizure of VIPs, interrupted armed robbery, and mentally unbalanced persons.

Fuselier (1988) and Soskis and Van Zandt (1986) promoted the four categories espoused by SOARU. These are the emotionally disturbed, the trapped criminal, the political terrorist, and the prison inmate. Butler et al. (1993) made note of these four types but also included a fifth category titled combination.

Table 1 suggests that there is a growing consensus regarding hostage taker typologies. The present author suggests six general categories. These are (a) Emotionally Disturbed, (b) Political Extremists, (c) Religious Fanatics, (d) Criminal, (e) Prison Inmate, and (f) Combination. The latter category is required because it is believed that many of the others are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Furthermore, a thorough reading of the literature indicates that there are relevant sub-categories for several of the six general categories enumerated above.

Starting with the Emotionally Disturbed category, Fuselier (1988), following Strentz (1986), noted four subtypes. These are (a) paranoid, various types, (b) depressed, various types, (c) inadequate personality, and (d) antisocial personality. The use of the latter subtype is questionable in the context of the Emotionally Disturbed category. This subtype is descriptive of a personality disorder, not an emotional disorder. Logically, it is much more likely that individuals with this personality disorder will be involved in hostage incidents with instrumental motivations, such as a trapped criminal or terrorist skyjacking, rather than the expressive acts of the emotionally disabled.

Likewise, the concept of inadequate personality disorder is believed to be of limited value as a subtype. Inadequate personality disorder is no longer a diagnostic classification as noted in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fourth Edition (1994). Previously, this personality disorder described an individual whose day-to-day responses to emotional, intellectual, social, and physical demands fell short of the expectations of others. Early skyjacker profile work

done by Hubbard (1973) suggested that a certain subset of these individuals did display inadequate personality traits. However, other diagnostic criteria were just as relevant. Hubbard's composite profile of approximately 50 North American skyjackers suggested that these individuals were White males, approximately 29 years old, with a lower socio-economic background. Most were significantly mentally disturbed, physically weak, narcissistic, depressed, and paranoid. Many were diagnosed as suffering from paranoid schizophrenia. Interestingly, they were not really interested in politics and did not keep up with current events.

In his analysis of the Emotionally Disturbed category of hostage taker, Pearce (1977) described the following subtypes: (a) the brain damaged individual, (b) the elderly/senile individual, (c) the retarded, depressed person, (d) the agitated, depressed person, (e) the schizophrenic, and (f) the barricaded person as an equivalent to attempted suicide (suicide by cop). The dynamics of the first two subtypes involve a person who is brain damaged, either through traumatic brain injury or senility, who then experiences a loss of inhibition or control, as well as develops paranoid ideation. This sets the stage for a hostage/barricade situation. The retarded, depressed person is a descriptive term for an individual whose depression is, in part, experienced with significant lethargy, fatigue, and motor slowing. It does not refer to a person with subnormal intelligence who is also depressed.

Kennedy and Dyer (1992), discussing a small sample of men who took their own children hostage, noted that each had a history of alcohol abuse, drug abuse, or both and a family history and ethos of violent and unstable relationships. The hostage taking was initiated by situational stress within the family. A similar phenomena was reported by Gist and Perry (1985). They described a group of hostage takers who did not appear to be motivated by severe emotional disturbance, criminal involvement, or political extremist activities. Instead, the hostage situations revolved around domestic incidents, suicidal gestures (as opposed to attempts), neighborhood conflicts, and alcohol related incidents. Finally, using Miron and Goldstein's (1979) typology of instrumental

versus expressive, it can logically be assumed that the latter motivational label is probably more appropriate for the emotionally disturbed hostage taker.

With respect to the Political Extremist, Knutson (1980) described two subtypes: the reluctant captor and the deliberate hostage taker. Her research suggested that the majority of American politically motivated hostage takers, at least until 1980, can be classified as the former subtype. Her interviews with these individuals indicated that they were unwilling, if not unable, to kill their hostages. Importantly, they did not attempt to dehumanize their hostages but rather before, during, and after the hostage event, experienced their captives as people and not things. The reluctant captors spent time trying to win over the hearts and minds of their hostages, some handing out pamphlets and other written material explaining their cause. They usually did not have a past criminal record. As hostage takers, they often acted in a naive or “dumb” manner in comparison to the deliberate hostage taker. For example, if a hostage asked to leave the hijacked plane, the reluctant captor might just let them go. Knutson summed up their personality style as dreamers and philosophers whose violent act was part of an attempt to right a wrong or a perceived injustice.

Deliberate hostage takers, on the other hand, are perfectly willing to execute their captives. The hostages are discardable implements to be used as long as needed by the hostage taker. They are supremely goal oriented but unfeeling, like a shark seeking a meal. Although uncaring, they are well aware of the hostages’ emotions but use them to their own ends. They will terrorize one minute and act friendly the next in their effort to control the situation. However, they are constantly aware that it is their ability to kill that provides them ultimate control. Interestingly, Knutson found in her sample that, as children, both subtypes of hostage takers were likely to have experienced a close brush with death.

There have been other attempts to explain the political extremist from a psychological point of view. Ferracuti (1982) concluded that the best approach to understanding these individuals is to

use what he terms “the subcultural theory.” In simple terms, political extremists live in their own sealed communities or subcultures with their own unique self-imposed value systems. What may be relevant for the culture at large may be meaningless for the political extremist’s subculture and vice versa. To understand a particular subtype of Political Extremist, one must first understand the values and mores of that subculture. Global theories applicable to all political extremists may be unobtainable. Thorough understanding may come only via investigation of each subculture.

Frankly, this makes sense. As an example of what this may entail from a scientist’s point of view, Ferracuti and Bruno (1981) studied right-wing Italian terrorists and then conceptualized a set of traits that they termed the “authoritarian-extremist personality.” These traits are only relevant to the political extremists studied, i.e., the right-wing Italian terrorist. This personality style or subtype is described in the following manner:

1. Ambivalent feelings towards authority.
2. Lack of psychological insight.
3. Conventional behavior patterns.
4. Emotionally detached from the consequences of their actions.
5. Sexual identity disturbances.
6. Superstitious and magical thinking.
7. Self-destructive.
8. Below normal educational experiences.
9. Perceives weapons as fetishes and follows violent subcultural norms.

Only Cooper (1981) enumerated the general hostage taker category of the Religious Fanatic. Special Operations and Research Unit (SOARU) personnel do not, as yet, use this category. Nevertheless, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) hostage negotiators have had some experience with this type of hostage taker. One of the best known incidents resulted in the April 19,

1993 deaths of 96 Branch Davidians in Waco, Texas. Some may argue that the Waco incident was a barricade situation without hostages. However, there were 17 children who died in the fire who could only be considered hostages, even if they would have disagreed with that label. Unlike what was reported in the media, the FBI had a full complement of negotiators that was trained, experienced, rested, and well managed. It is this author's opinion that this group of potential barricade incident participants or hostage takers is worth labeling separately from the other general categories.

With respect to understanding possible subtypes of this category, the advice of Ferracuti (1982) concerning understanding political extremists probably applies. A thorough understanding of Religious Fanatics will likely require analysis of a particular cult's internal mores and values.

The Criminal category is usually thought of as consisting of the trapped criminal. For example, the bank robber who is unable to make his escape before the police arrive. However, from the victims' point of view, i.e., the hostage and the third party the hostage taker is trying to influence, the kidnapping situation is just as traumatic. Corsi (1981) developed a typology of terrorism that involved analysis of terrorist activity along two dimensions. His analysis is appropriate to not only terrorist hostage takers but to others as well. What is relevant to the present discussion is Corsi's Type 1 and Type 2 events. Both events are similar in that the perpetrators are intending to take hostages. They differ in that the hostage takers intend to hold the hostages at a known site in a Type 1 event and at an unknown site in a Type 2 event. This difference in location impacts most on negotiator style. However, the hostage experience remains the same (Siegel, 1984).

The major subtype in the Criminal category is the criminal psychopath. The criminal psychopath is also believed to be a major subtype in the Prison category of hostage taker. However, other subtypes also occur. For example, in the November 23, 1987 Oakdale, Louisiana, riot where 200 Cuban inmates held 26 people hostage at a Federal Detention Center, the only hostage seriously

physically injured was stabbed by an emotionally disturbed inmate. This occurrence is also an example of a Combination hostage taker.

In summary, this author presents, in Table 2, the following hostage taker typology. More extensive detailing of all possible subtypes awaits further research effort.

Hostage Incident Database Analyses

Ongoing systematic nationwide collection of hostage incident information is not being done. The fact that hostage taking is not a separate criminal offense may be one reason for this lack of data gathering. In other words, hostage taking occurs in the context of other criminal offenses, such as bank robbery or kidnapping, and it is these crimes that are reported and statistically analyzed, not the hostage incident. This lack of systematic research is unfortunate. However, a small sample of relevant databases exists in the public domain. The information contained in these databases is enlightening and confirms the need to develop and maintain a nationwide data collection effort. However, when analyzing these databases one must keep in mind the definitional structure of the data (i.e., international versus national hostage incidents, political extremist versus prison inmate hostage takers, etc.) as well as the time frame during which the data was collected.

Edward Mickolus (1976), while a Yale graduate student and later as a policy analyst with the Central Intelligence Agency, developed a computerized database of over 3,329 international terrorist incidents from 1968 through 1977. This database is termed ITERATE which stands for International Terrorism: Attributes of Terrorist Events. Note that the ITERATE data excludes all hostage taking incidents which occurred in the United States.

In 1981, Corsi published an analysis of ITERATE data which covered 539 events of international terrorism occurring between January, 1970 and July, 1974. In part, Corsi studied (a) the type of hostage target (people versus property) in relation to whether the hostage location was

known or unknown (Type 1 versus Type 2 event); (b) the purpose of the hostage taking; (c) the attitude of the hostage takers toward their own death; and (d) the duration of the hostage event.

Analysis of the data tells us that for a four and half year period in the early 1970s the most favored hostage taking scenario by Political Extremists was hijacking airplanes, followed by kidnapping. Overall, the most frequent purpose was the forcing of specific demands on a third party. The majority of Political Extremist hostage takers were not suicidal. In fact, the kidnappers developed elaborate escape plans. The duration of a Type 1 incident was usually one day, while the duration of a Type 2 incident was usually five days or more.

A more thorough analysis of the ITERATE data was performed by Head (1990). Head used the full database of 3,329 international terrorist incidents from 1968 through 1977 in his study. During this time frame, a total of 6,042 hostages were held. Head was specifically interested in hostage taking situations and rearranged the ITERATE into three sub-categories of political extremist hostage incidents. These are hijacking, kidnapping, and barricade situations. In part, Head studied the number of hostage takers in terrorist hostage taking incidents and the number and types of casualties in such incidents. A review of his analysis, presented in Table 3, suggests that, from 1968 through 1977, international political extremist hostage takers preferred to work in groups of three or more.

Table 4 provides some very significant information about casualty rates in Political Extremist hostage incidents. First, it is apparent that, from 1968 through 1977, Political Extremist hostage situations were not particularly lethal to either the hostage or the hostage taker. For example, in only about 17% of the incidents were one or more hostages wounded and in only about 19% of the incidents were there one or more deaths. It is also striking to note that barricade situations were the most dangerous (more so for the hostage than for the hostage taker in terms of being wounded) and kidnapping incidents were the least dangerous. Explosives were the most frequent type of weapon

used. Likewise, analyses of ITERATE data indicate that hostage situations where negotiation was used were generally less lethal than those where a government refused to acknowledge the hostage takers' demand (Miller, 1980).

A more recent analysis of Political Extremist hostage taking was performed by Friedland and Merari (1992). They developed a small database of 69 incidents of international and domestic politically motivated hostage taking incidents between the years of 1979 and 1988. Specifically, the incidents were either a barricade situation or a hijacking of transport, i.e., airplanes, buses, trains, etc. Kidnap cases were excluded from their database. These researchers were interested in developing a descriptive profile of the hostage incidents as well as identifying the factors that determine the outcome of the hostage incident.

Friedland and Merari's results indicated that in their sample, hijacking of airplanes and barricade incidents occurred with equal frequency (46.4% each). The majority of the hostages were civilian (59.4%) and did not possess a symbolic meaning for the hostage taker. The average number of hostages in a barricade incident was 35 with a range from 1 to 156. The average number of hostages in a hijacking incident was 131 with a range from 3 to 434. In 63.3% of the cases, there were five or fewer hostage takers, but the use of larger teams was also observed. For example, in 15% of the cases, the hostage takers used teams of between 6 and 10, and in 23.2% of the cases, teams of 10 or more were used.

In 43.8% of the incidents, the hostage situation lasted 24 hours or less. The remainder were fairly evenly distributed along the time line: 1 to 2 days--17.5%; 2 to 5 days--14%; 6 to 10 days--7.2%; and 10 days or more--17.5%.

In terms of outcome, the most frequent conclusion was violent, i.e., assault by the authorities (31.1%). It is unclear if this signifies a trend away from the low casualty rates reported in the

decade-old ITERATE data. If it does, then Political Extremist hostage situations are becoming more dangerous.

The next most frequent outcome was unconditional surrender by the hostage takers (19.7%). In 36% of the incidents, the authorities gave the hostage takers full or partial concessions. A violent conclusion to the hostage situation was more probable if the hostage incident was a barricade situation, a trained rescue team was available, and no attempts at mediation or negotiation were made. This last result is consistent with the research of Miller (1980) mentioned above.

In his research efforts, Head (1990) developed two other databases. The first he termed the Hostage Event Analytic Database (HEAD). This database included 3,330 accounts of hostage taking with the primary focus being on any hostage incident that occurred in the United States between 1973 through 1982. The second database was developed from the files of the New York Police Department Hostage Recovery Program and included 137 hostage taking incidents for the same time period.

A synopsis of some of the significant findings from the HEAD database are presented in Tables 5 through 9. The HEAD data represent a more random sample of hostage incidents in comparison to the ITERATE data which dealt only with international political extremist hostage takers. Of note is the fact that the HEAD data suggest that homes, either of the hostage taker or the hostage, are one of the most frequent scenes of hostage taking, second only to various forms of transportation. This fact coincides with data from Strentz (1985) and Butler, Leitenberg, and Fuselier (1993) which suggested that the most frequent category of hostage taker in the United States is the Emotionally Disturbed. It is hypothesized that many of these individuals are taking family members, relatives, or acquaintances hostage in the home. Within the transportation category, aircraft had the highest frequency, making up 201 incidents. Also note that about 12.5% of the hostages were captured and held in their work place.

Seventy percent of the hostage takers in the HEAD data were categorized as criminals, prison inmates, or emotionally disturbed individuals. This may account for some of the differences noted in the HEAD data in comparison to the information reported from databases made up solely of Political Extremist hostage takers. For example, in the HEAD database, the hostage taker was more often a young, White male, acting alone, who took only one or two hostages. The most frequent type of weapon used by the hostage taker was a handgun (31%). Generally, the hostage event lasts no more than one day (approximately 31% ended within 6 hours) and the incident usually conclude with no one wounded or killed. However, hostages appear more at risk for injury in comparison to hostage takers. Perhaps one reason for such a high survival rate amongst the hostage incident participants resides in the fact that some form of negotiation was used in 64% of the hostage incidents (463 incidents used a trained or untrained negotiator versus 270 incidents which did not have a negotiator of any sort present).

In 1989, Butler et al. (1993) surveyed all state police (n = 50), large municipal police agencies (n = 191), and a random sample of each state's small municipal agencies (n = 1169) with respect to their experience with hostage situations from 1986 through 1988. Fifty percent (n = 25) of the state police, 69% (n = 130) of the large municipal police agencies, and 45% (n = 529) of the small municipal law enforcement agencies responded. As noted in the Introduction, 68% (n = 17) of the state police agencies, 96% (n = 125) of the large municipal agencies, and 30% (n = 158) of the small municipal law enforcement agencies had a designated negotiator. These researchers, using this sample of 300 agencies which employed a designated negotiator, then studied various hostage situation characteristics.

Butler et al. (1993) found that negotiated surrender was the most common outcome (65% of the 410 incidents studied), with assault by the authorities the next most common (17%). Also, the data indicate that domestic law enforcement deals primarily with hostage situations that are not

politically motivated. Of these, the most frequent hostage taker typology is Emotionally Disturbed. The next most frequent is the Criminal. The data also indicate that the lethality of the domestic hostage incident is much less than that observed in the politically motivated hostage incidents observed in the prior databases. With respect to hostage taker deaths, the data indicate that the hostage taker was killed in 6% of the incidents during assault and that the hostage taker committed suicide in 4% of the incidents.

Head (1990) provided an in-depth view of a large municipal law enforcement agency's experience in his analysis of 137 hostage incidents worked by members of the New York Police Department (NYPD) Hostage Recovery Program from 1973 through 1982. A synopsis of the significant findings is presented in Tables 10 through 14.

The data shown in Table 10 indicate that the home, either of the hostage taker or the hostage, is the primary hostage incident scene. This is followed by public places and the work place of the hostage. Hostage situations that involve transportation declined significantly in comparison to the previous databases. Most likely, this is due to the fact that the majority of the NYPD hostage takers were not Political Extremists, perpetrators who appear to favor mobile hostage situations.

Eighty-four percent of the hostage takers in the NYPD data were categorized as criminals, prison inmates, or emotionally disturbed individuals. This is consistent with the data produced by Butler et al. (1993). However, unlike these later research findings, the majority of the NYPD hostage takers were typed as Criminals, including some Prison Inmates, not Emotionally Disturbed. The data also indicated that, more often than not, the hostage taker was a young, White male (35%) or Black male (26%), acting alone, who took only one or two hostages. Again, the most frequent type of weapon used by the hostage taker was a handgun (41%). Generally, the hostage event lasted no more than one day (approximately 61% ended within 6 hours) and the incident usually concluded

with no one wounded or killed. However, the hostages appeared more at risk for injury than the hostage taker.

The Dynamics of Hostage Taking and Negotiation

In some ways, hostage taking is analogous to theater, but a theater of terror instead of amusement. The hostage taker is the star, the hostages the supporting cast, and the public and law enforcement the audience. However, another way to conceptualize hostage taking, and perhaps a way that is more practical, is to understand hostage taking as an attempt by the hostage taker to solve a problem. In this light, hostage taking is a behavior designed and implemented by the captor in an effort to meet his or her needs, whether instrumental or expressive. Obviously, to initiate such a desperate act, the hostage taker must be experiencing extreme frustration.

Three different participants are linked in a hostage taking situation. The hostage taker is attempting to influence a third person or entity to meet his or her needs by threatening the well being of the hostages. Seemingly the hostage taker has the upper hand. The hostage taker creates a crisis and either his or her demands are met or the hostages are killed. This childlike simplicity colors all hostage incidents and marks hostage taking as the ultimate narcissistic act.

The key question in any hostage situation is whether or not there exists a bargaining range. Can a bargaining model be implemented or will the incident be controlled by the concept of “brinkmanship”? Brinkmanship may be defined as the deliberate creation of risk, designed to be sufficiently intolerable to one’s opponent so as to induce that person to meet one’s demands. The brink is not a sharp precipice but a slippery slope, gradually getting steeper, out of the control of either party (Dixit & Nalebuff, 1991). In brinkmanship, the winner takes all; there are no 50-50 solutions. Initially, the hostage taker attempts to predefine the situation as one in which brinkmanship, or crisis bargaining, is the rule. It is the negotiator’s role to redefine the rules of

communication, if he or she can, from one where crisis bargaining techniques are employed to one where normative bargaining techniques are used (Donohue, Ramesh, Kaufmann, & Smith, 1991). Normative bargaining may be defined as that style of negotiation most commonly observed in the everyday world where the parties attempt to develop a mutually satisfying agreement based upon the concept of quid pro quo.

Crisis bargaining is characterized by several features. These are (a) the use of coercion, (b) bargaining for high stakes, (c) focusing on one alternative, (d) high degree of emotional content, (e) preponderance of face or ego issues, (f) the feeling of urgency, (g) the lack of complete information, and (h) failure to work out detailed implementation and monitoring plans. Looking at these in more detail, the hostage taker believes that accommodation is not possible. Thus, the hostage taker feels compelled to coerce or force his or her opponent to act in the way the hostage taker desires. The stakes are high for the hostage taker, the hostage, and the negotiator. At the very least, someone's life is at risk. The hostage taker has one position or desire and focuses on that without considering other alternatives. In contrast, during normative bargaining where the disputants are not actively attempting to coerce each other, where the stakes are not life and death, the parties are usually more willing to develop and consider alternative proposals.

Bargaining in a crisis situation is usually highly emotional, with the predominant feelings displayed being anger, hostility, and fear. Likewise, where bargainers use coercive strategies and tactics, face issues enter into the process. Substantive issues are thus left undiscussed while communication escalates into conflict. Crisis bargaining is rife with feelings of urgency, as well as lack of complete information. In part, the lack of information is determined situationally in that there may not be enough time to acquire sufficient facts. However, the lack of information is also determined internally. Because of the very nature of crisis bargaining, which focuses on the use of coercion, face, and one alternative, the parties experience difficulty performing possibility thinking

and seeking complete information and understanding. Finally, crisis bargainers tend to not work out detailed implementation and monitoring plans for their agreements. The stress of crisis limits the disputants' abilities to control their emotions, think creatively, and develop contingency plans in the event the agreement breaks down.

No matter if the hostage taking incident is a well organized and executed act by political extremists or a haphazard act by a jewelry store robber, the stress of the crisis erodes higher level thought processes and exposes the more primitive, and dangerous, emotions and impulses of the "lizard" brain. This is where the trained negotiator fits into the puzzle. It is the main role of the negotiator to move the bargaining away from brinkmanship towards more rational problem solving. To do this, negotiators face three key issues. These are (a) relational issues, (b) content issues, and (c) strategic issues.

One of the first things a negotiator must do is develop a relationship with the hostage taker. Schlossberg (1980) noted that the negotiator should "establish himself as a significant "other" (p. 115). Rogan, Donohue, and Lyles (1990) stated that the negotiator must "communicate support for the hostage-taker's plight to make that person receptive to the negotiator's demands. The role of the negotiator is therefore dualistic; being both trusted friend and hated adversary of the hostage-taker" (p. 77). Donohue et al. (1991) outline four relational parameters that are crucial in turning crisis bargaining into more normative bargaining. These are (a) trust, (b) attraction, (c) formality, and (d) control. By attending and empathizing, the negotiator attempts to build trust. Establishing trust in himself or herself makes the negotiator more attractive psychologically to the hostage taker. Manipulating the formality of communication, as well as the hostage taker's perceived control over the communication, helps to de-escalate the need for coercion and threats and helps foster a working relationship between the parties.

As the negotiator develops a relational base, he or she is also analyzing the content of the hostage taker's messages. Specifically, three content issues are crucial. These are (a) the problem, (b) the feelings, and (c) information integration. Remember that the hostage incident is an attempt by the hostage taker to solve a problem. Thus, it is crucial for the negotiator to understand the hostage taker's problem and the hostage taker's feelings about the problem. Then, via reflective listening and other techniques, the negotiator attempts to guide the hostage taker to explore and develop other, more rational, solutions.

Strategic issues are those strategies and tactics that the hostage taker and negotiators use to gain concessions from each other. They include (a) position adjustment, (b) compliance gaining, and (c) proposal development. Recognizing the hostage taker's techniques and then countering them helps move crisis bargaining toward normative bargaining.

Hostage negotiation does not take place in a vacuum and the negotiator is not alone or, usually, in a face-to-face conversation with the hostage taker. Typically, the negotiator is part of a team and is a member of a law enforcement agency. The typical team for most large municipal law enforcement agencies is made up of the primary negotiator, the secondary negotiator, and the behavioral scientist consultant. When possible, the FBI utilizes a more elaborate seven person team. This includes the primary negotiator, the secondary negotiator, the negotiation team leader, the negotiation recorder, the status coordinator, the tactical liaison, and the behavioral science expert (Fuselier & Van Zandt, 1987).

Only the primary negotiator talks to the hostage taker. The secondary negotiator can relieve the primary, but his or her most important purpose is to "act as negotiator to the negotiator. In effect, the backup permits the primary negotiator to ventilate and share some of the stress" (Schlossberg, 1980, p. 115). The negotiation team leader communicates with the on-scene commander. The tactical liaison channels information between the tactical team and the negotiators.

The negotiation recorder maintains a negotiations log and monitors the audio probe if one is in place. The status coordinator maintains the critical incident board and acts as a resource person. The behavioral science expert constantly assesses the mental status of the hostage taker and recommends negotiation techniques and approaches (Fuselier & Van Zandt, 1987).

According to Butler et al. (1993), 55% of the large municipal agencies in their sample employed a professional consultant, 76% of whom were doctoral level psychologists. With respect to the state police, 59% employed a consultant while only 25% of the small municipal agencies employed a professional consultant. The three major roles of the behavioral scientist consultant are hostage taker assessment (82%), consultation on negotiation techniques (59%), and post-incident counseling (64%). Significantly, Butler et al. (1993) found that those organizations which employed mental health professionals as consultants were much more successful in concluding hostage situations without bloodshed in comparison to those that did not.

Rueth (1993) noted that the behavioral science expert collects data from several sources, including listening to the hostage taker's conversations with the negotiator as well as interviewing relevant third persons. The consultant attempts to develop a dynamic diagnosis of the hostage taker. That is a description of the hostage taker's thoughts, mood, sensorium, cognition, suicide potential, and reality contact. This information can then be used to alter negotiation style. For example, Pearce (1977) suggested that with elderly/senile hostage takers, negotiations should take place during the daylight hours because their level of consciousness fluctuates at night. Also, with these individuals, the negotiator should initially focus on happy experiences from the past because their recent memory is often quite impaired. Fuselier (1986) noted that, with psychotically depressed individuals, understanding and support should be provided; but without telling the individual that "things will be okay" because the person will believe that the negotiator does not really understand. The negotiator should "gently interrupt [the hostage taker's] long statements about 'sins' or death

and convince him to talk about interests, hobbies, or anything positive, relating to his self-worth” (Fuselier, p. 3).

Likewise, Fuselier (1986) recommended interacting with a paranoid schizophrenic differently than with a paranoid personality disorder. The first type of hostage taker is experiencing a thought disorder and manifests hallucinations and delusions. The second type of hostage taker has adequate reality contact but demonstrates a life long history of suspicion and distrust.

The paranoid personality can be involved in a spontaneous hostage incident provoked by jealousy centering around a spouse or lover. With the paranoid personality, a business-like negotiation focusing on problem solving is recommended. The paranoid schizophrenic often purposefully initiates a hostage situation for bizarre reasons.

A case example is presented by Strentz (1986). In May 1982, a 28-year-old, White, male, armed with a handgun, entered a television station in Phoenix, Arizona. He fired a shot, took hostages, and demanded to read a lengthy statement over the television. Recommended negotiation guidelines were followed, which included (a) encouraging the hostage taker to talk, (b) not confronting or arguing, (c) stalling for time, (d) interacting in a sincere manner but not being overly friendly, and (e) continually assessing the hostage taker’s dangerousness.

Of note is the recommendation to stall for time. Specifically, this means not giving in to the hostage taker’s demands too soon. It would have been easy for the Phoenix police to immediately let the hostage taker read his rambling statement over the air. But Strentz noted that if a hostage taker’s instrumental needs are met too soon (reading the statement), before the hostage taker is fatigued, he or she may violently act out his or her expressive needs. In this case example the negotiator stalled from 5:00 p.m. until 10:00 p.m. before permitting the statement to be read. “By this time, the subject was fatigued and the initial excitement had dissipated sufficiently so that he

surrendered when his instrumental demand was met. Clearly, his expressive demand for attention had been satisfied by the hours of negotiating “ (Strentz, p. 14).

Another episode of a paranoid schizophrenic hostage taker is reported by Wesselius and DeSarno (1983). In their case report, a 24-year-old, single, White, male, armed with several pistols, a sawed-off shotgun, a machine gun, ammunition, a sandwich, and a carton of cigarettes took over a law enforcement agency on a Saturday, capturing seven hostages. The hostage taker demanded to see five specific law enforcement officers and a chaplain. During the incident, the hostage taker’s mood fluctuated from calm to agitated to violent, seemingly in random fashion. His paranoid irrationality was marked.

[Standard negotiations began. However], the negotiator reported only fleeting moments of rapport with HT. Any noise or event in the hostage-holding area disrupted his ability to relate to the negotiator. He required frequent reassurance from the negotiator in order not to be overwhelmed with feelings of being trapped and out of control or that he was being tricked. An on-site psychiatric advisor assessed HT as erratic and homicidal. The hostages were considered to be in high risk of being harmed. Officials in the command post made the decision that HT was to be stopped tactically when an opportunity arose. Soon after, when HT’s gun barrel was pointed away from the hostages and there was minimal risk to the hostages from ricocheting bullets, HT was killed by a police sniper and the siege ended (p. 36).

Donohue et al. (1991) wrote that hostage negotiation is a five stage process. These stages are termed (a) Intelligence Gathering, (b) Introduction and Relationship Development, (c) Problem Clarification and Relationship Development, (d) Problem Solving, and (e) Resolution. The goal of negotiations is the surrender of the hostage taker and the release of the hostages.

During the first stage, the negotiators gather intelligence, develop a negotiation strategy, and attempt to predict any problems or difficulties that may arise. The negotiators typically do not make contact with the hostage taker until the tactical teams have secured the area. Stage two starts when the primary negotiator makes contact with the hostage taker and begins to structure the communications between them. The negotiator attempts to build a relationship, uses an informal tone, and attempts to defer action on demands until a modicum of trust and attraction is developed. During stage three, the negotiator continues to build a relationship and at the same time attempts to understand the problem from the hostage taker's point of view. A goal for the end of stage three is a tacit agreement between hostage taker and negotiator to bargain normatively rather than using brinkmanship. Thus, stage four is taken up with the negotiator and hostage taker attempting to problem solve a more rational solution to the situation. The negotiator, while continuing to build trust, becomes more directive in his communications. He or she develops proposals and seeks compliance. During the final stage of negotiations, a key point is to slow down the pace of communication to ensure that no mistakes are made. The negotiator carefully implants the specifics of the hostages' release and the hostage taker's surrender by replaying the proposed scenario over and over in his or her conversation with the perpetrator. Likewise, the negotiator continually assesses the strength of the fragile bond of trust that he or she has developed to make sure that the working relationship remains intact with the hostage taker.

Schlossberg (1980) wrote that the negotiating team, or members of the team, perform five important functions during the hostage incident. These are (a) gathering intelligence, (b) organizing the intelligence, (c) coordinating with the containment team, (d) analyzing the intelligence, and (f) developing strategy.

Of course, the above negotiation models highlight the perfect situation when everything goes as planned. In the real world, this does not always happen. According to Fuselier and Van

Zandt (1987) the negotiator can measure his or her progress in negotiating, or lack thereof, using the following seven guidelines: (a) no one has been killed since the negotiations started; (b) there has been a decrease in the number of verbal threats; (c) the hostage taker's tone of voice is less emotional, that is slower and lower; (d) the hostage taker talks more; (e) the hostage taker talks about personal things, i.e., expressive goals; (f) some hostages have been freed; and (g) deadlines that were initially set by the hostage taker have passed without crisis.

Besides the above seven factors Soskis and Van Zandt (1986) noted that negative signs for successful negotiation include: (a) the hostage taker has killed an important person in his life, i.e., his spouse or child; (b) the hostage taker states that he wants the police to kill him; (c) the hostage taker has set a deadline for his death; and (d) the hostage taker refuses to negotiate.

The Hostage Experience

Being a hostage is a traumatic event with severe psychological and behavioral repercussions, both for the short term as well as the long term. The hostage experience has been tagged with several names: (a) the Stockholm Syndrome (Hacker, 1976); (b) the Common Sense Syndrome (Strentz, 1977); (c) the Survivor Identification Syndrome (Schlossberg, 1980); (d) the Hostage Response Syndrome (Wesselius and DeSarno, 1983); and (e) the Hostage Identification Syndrome (Turner, 1985). Whatever one calls the experience, the phenomena is not well understood by the public or the media and surviving hostages often receive "secondary injuries" from rescuers, friends, family, or the public (Symonds, 1980a; Symonds, 1980b; Hillman, 1981; Simon & Blum, 1987; McDuff, 1992; Allondi, 1994).

The initial psychological phases experienced by the hostage are usually (a) denial, (b) delusions of immediate rescue, (c) "busywork", and (d) taking stock of one's life (Strentz, 1980). Generally, a person is not prepared psychologically for being captured and threatened with death.

Thus, a typical first reaction is denial. Phrases such as, “This can’t be happening. . .it must be some sort of joke,” run through the captives’ minds. These thoughts are then followed by wish/need statements, magical in content, such as “the police will get here any minute and save us.” As the reality of the situation sets in, many hostages seek to avoid thinking about their plight with “busywork”. This can include counting objects or persons, thinking snatches of song over and over in their mind, etc. Strentz (1980) also noted that most of the hostages he interviewed admitted to thinking about their lives, taking stock of the pluses and minuses, and considering things they might do differently if they survived.

Likewise associated with the initial phases is the phenomenon of frozen fright (Symonds, 1980a; Symonds, 1980b). Symonds wrote that few hostages run around in a panic, screaming. They are not allowed to do so by the hostage taker. Rather, the hostages’ complete beings become focused on the hostage taker--the giver of life or death. This focus is reinforced by the hostage taker who wants the hostages to know that the hostage taker thoroughly controls their existence. In this context, the hostages experience a dissociation of affect from thought and behavior. They display pseudo-calmness as well as cooperative behavior. Existing within this hostile environment, feeling isolated, and helpless, the hostages lose the ability to think calmly and rationally. They develop what Symonds terms “traumatic psychological infantilism” (1980b, p. 40). They have to comply, obey, placate, and submit or they will be killed.

The hostages may or may not develop a positive bond with the hostage taker. This aspect of the hostage experience depends upon two basic factors: (a) time and, more importantly, (b) lack of negative contact between the hostage and hostage taker. Time by itself does not insure that a positive bond will develop. More specifically, if the hostages are beaten or raped, the odds that positive feelings will develop are unlikely. Rather, the positive bonding is fostered by a “pathological transference” (Symonds, 1980b, p. 41). When the hostage taker, who clearly can torture or kill the

hostages does not do so, then the captives feel a sense of gratitude for being granted the favor of life.

Law enforcement personnel and the public must understand that this bonding experience can occur in almost any individual, not just naive citizens. Symonds reported several examples of experienced police officers who were held captive and manifested the phenomena (Symonds, 1980a; Symonds, 1980b). One was an off duty detective who was held captive after he walked in on a robbery. He was tied and a bag was placed over his head. He listened as the robbers argued amongst themselves about killing him. Eventually they left, letting him live. Sometime later, after two of the criminals were apprehended, one of them told the detective “You owe me something--I saved your life” (Symonds 1980b, p. 41). The detective agreed, visited the man in prison, and over time, developed a close relationship with him.

The positive feeling can also develop within the hostage taker. Ochberg (1978) reported the experience of Gerald Vaders who was held hostage by South Moluccans in December 1975 on a train in Holland. Mr. Vaders was selected to be executed. Before his execution, he asked to speak with a fellow hostage. With the hostage takers listening, Mr. Vaders talked of various problems in his family life and left instructions for his wife regarding how to deal with a foster child. After he was through, Mr. Vaders indicated he was ready to die. His captors refused to kill him. Rather, they quickly selected another man and shot him instead. Mr. Vaders had ceased to be a nonentity but had become a person.

Strentz (1980) suggested that one duty of the negotiator is to foster the positive transference between hostage taker and hostage. This can be done by asking the hostage taker to ask his captives about their health situation and to provide messages for the hostages’ families. Hostage takers who are psychopaths do not care, however, and never will. Also hostage takers who isolate the hostages

by placing them in another room or blindfolding and gagging them will likely continue to dehumanize the hostages, making it much easier for the hostage takers to kill them.

Likewise, different cultural values; preexisting racial, ethnic, religious, or ideological stereotypes; and the lack of a common language can work against the development of a positive bond between hostage taker and hostage. In these cases, it is possible that the passage of time will, in fact, work against the hostages' survival as the hostage taker's negative view of his or her hostages is selectively reinforced (Turner, 1985). An excellent example is documented by Jacobson (1973). Jacobson was herself a hostage, along with 148 other airline passengers, held for 7 days in September 1970 by members of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. The passengers were mainly Americans or Europeans of Jewish ancestry. As the days progressed, Jacobson observed that the initially helpful Arab physician assigned by the hostage takers to take care of them became increasingly hostile and rejecting.

Another phenomena of the hostage experience which appears to occur with great frequency, even in the absence of positive feelings for the hostage taker, is the development of negative feelings for the authorities. The hostages do not care about the demands of the hostage takers; they want to be set free unharmed, and they want their freedom now. As the negotiations drag out, the hostages come to resent the authorities' seeming indifference to their plight.

Because of the hostage experience, the hostage recovery team can never rely on help from the hostages to effect their own rescue. For example, case after case has shown that hostages are more likely to obey the hostage taker during a rescue attempt rather than members of the special weapons and action teams (SWAT).

Following rescue, hostages continue to suffer psychological difficulties. It is clear that they are experiencing post traumatic stress disorder (Wesselius & DeSarno, 1983; Allondi, 1994). Symptoms include an exaggerated startle response; nightmares; sleep disturbance; guilt; problems

with memory and concentration; withdrawal from previously enjoyed activities, behaviors, and relationships; and exacerbation of symptoms when events occur that in some way resemble the traumatic event. Interestingly, this has been documented even in those hostages who developed strong positive feelings for their captors. Hillman (1981) and Jessee, Strickland, and Ladewig (1992) observed these symptoms in adults and children even a year post event. In fact, Allondi (1994) reported that nine years after the Moluccan hostage incident, approximately one half of the hostages and their families continued to have symptoms of post traumatic stress disorder, with treatment being required by 10 to 12% of the hostages and their families.

Rescued hostages require special care. McDuff (1992) suggested that special intervention teams need to interact with hostage victims after their release and before they reenter their normal world. These teams can help in the following ways: (a) foster the development of a supportive internal social network amongst the victims designed to foster adaptation and rehabilitation; (b) act as gatekeepers between the victims and others, thus controlling the potentially intrusive impact of media and authorities; and (c) educate the victims and their families with respect to the psychological consequences of their hostage experience as well as gives special attention to the not infrequent destructive, blaming attitude the public often adopts towards hostage victims.

Simon and Blum (1987) noted that unlike neurotic patients who must remember and work through past psychological trauma, hostage victims need to overcome their trauma and learn to forget it. To achieve this goal, Symonds (1980b) noted that the hostages must be shown how to restore their sense of power. This is accomplished therapeutically by helping the victims reduce their perception of helplessness, isolation, and domination.

Can anything be done to inoculate potential hostages against the stress of the hostage experience? This is a controversial question. Hillman (1981) studied 14 prison guards who were held hostage during the February 1980 Santa Fe prison riot. During this riot, the guards suffered

extreme helplessness, fear, and sensory overload. Each one decided he was going to die as they listened to the torture deaths of other victims around them. Hillman concluded that “no amount of preparation can adequately anticipate what the hostage experience will be like” (p. 1195). Hillman pointed out that “even experienced pilots captured during the Viet Nam war manifested some hysterical reactions, as well as psychotic reactions during their capture” (p. 1195).

However, Strentz and Auerbach (1988) and Auerbach, Kiesler, Strentz, Schmidt, and Serio (1994) concluded that perhaps potential hostages can be trained to better cope with the hostage experience. These researchers reported an experiment where 57 subjects were divided into three groups. One group received training in emotion focused stress coping techniques such as deep breathing, deep muscle relaxation, thought stopping, and self-directed fantasy. A second group received training in problem focused stress coping techniques such as prisoner of war tap codes, ways of maintaining personal dignity, and methods of aiding as well as projecting a willingness to aid each other. The third group received no special education. The subjects were then subjected to a simulated four-day hostage situation.

Results suggested that those subjects who received training in emotion focused stress coping techniques were more successful in controlling anxiety and exhibited less behavioral disturbance during the hostage simulation. Also, these same subjects reported perceiving the simulated hostage takers as less dominant and more friendly and were themselves perceived in the same light by the hostage takers. This research is interesting but as with all simulation studies the conclusions that can be drawn to the real world must be done so with care.

Conclusion

Although hostage taking has been in existence for over a thousand years, the phenomena has not been studied systematically until the latter quarter of this century. Through this recent research,

progress has been made in developing hostage taker typologies and understanding the motivations of different hostage takers. Likewise, the dynamics of the hostage incident are beginning to be investigated. This research has increased our understanding of the hostage taking event including its phases, applicable negotiator techniques, as well as analyses of the hostage experience both during and after the event.

Much of this early work has been performed by law enforcement personnel and the few behavioral scientists who work with them. Likewise, most of this work is anecdotal and theoretical in nature. Almost no empirical research has been performed. The databases discussed above represent the majority of statistical research that exists in the public domain. Thus, much work remains for future investigators.

Areas ripe for further research are (a) the systematic documentation and analysis of hostage events, (b) analysis and development of effective negotiation techniques, (c) analysis and development of effective hostage victim treatment techniques, and (d) understanding the impact of media on hostage events and their resolution. First, it would be appropriate that a national database of hostage incidents be created similar to that developed for violent crimes at the National Center for the Analysis of Violent Crime. Even though there is presently no systematic collection and review of hostage incidents on a national level, this does not preclude hostage recovery programs associated with local law enforcement and state police from developing and maintaining their own databases. After a period of time, these local databases could well be crucial storehouses of information relevant to understanding local hostage incidents.

Presently, hostage negotiation is taught more as an art form, with little scientific analysis of technique effectiveness or lack thereof. However, programs are available which can be used to understand, critique, and educate negotiators. One excellent example is the verbal interactional analysis technique developed by Fowler, DiVivo, and Fowler (1985). Coupling the use of databases

with a systematic analysis of negotiation technique would result in the ability to empirically validate negotiation style and effectiveness.

Anecdotal evidence suggests that relatively few hostage victims seek post incident treatment although it has been empirically demonstrated that most victims will suffer from post traumatic stress disorder. Why might this be true? Is it because current therapies are ineffective, because hostage victims feel publicly stigmatized, or is there some other reason or set of reasons? Longitudinal studies of hostage victims need to be performed in an effort to document the most effective treatment modalities as well as gain a better understanding of the effects of being held hostage.

In those hostage situations lasting one day or less, the media probably has minimal impact. This probably is not true for longer term hostage events. What effect does the media play in hostage situations? To what extent do news stories influence future hostage takers? Can media stories have a negative impact on the recovery of hostage victims? Should ethical guidelines be developed for news reporters regarding the way in which they conduct themselves during and after a hostage situation? These are just a few questions that require thought and consideration by researchers.

In conclusion, although much has been accomplished, more remains to be done.

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Table 1

EXISTING TYPOLOGIES OF HOSTAGE TAKING

<i>RESEARCHER</i>	<i>YEAR</i>	<i>HOSTAGE TAKER CATEGORIES</i>
Middendorf	1975	1. Political 2. Escape 3. Personal Gain
Kobetz	1975	1. Prison Takeovers/Escape Attempts 2. Aircraft Hijackings 3. Seizure of VIPs 4. Interrupted Armed Robbery 5. Mentally Unbalanced Persons
Hacker	1976	1. Crusaders 2. Criminals 3. Crazies
Miron & Goldstein	1979	1. Instrumental 2. Expressive
Cooper	1981	1. Political Extremists 2. Fleeing Criminals 3. Institutionalized Persons 4. Wronged Persons 5. Religious Fanatics 6. Mentally Disturbed Persons
Wesselius & DeSarno	1983	1. Instrumental 2. Expressive 3. Combination
Strentz	1986	1. Anti-social Personality Disorder 2. Inadequate Personality Disorder 3. Psychotically Depressed 4. Paranoid Schizophrenic 5. Political Assassin
Soskis & Van Zandt	1986	1. Emotionally Disturbed 2. Trapped Criminal 3. Political 4. Prison Inmate
Fuselier	1988	1. Emotionally Disturbed 2. Trapped Criminal 3. Political 4. Prison Inmate
Butler et al.	1993	1. Emotionally Disturbed 2. Trapped Criminal 3. Political 4. Prison Inmate 5. Combination

Table 2

HOSTAGE TAKER TYPOLOGIES

<i>GENERAL CATEGORY</i>	<i>POSSIBLE SUBTYPES</i>
Emotionally Disturbed	1. Brain Damaged 2. Elderly/Senile 3. Depressed, Various Types 4. Paranoid, Various Types 5. Schizophrenic 6. Substance Abuser 7. Family Disputes
Political Extremists	1. Reluctant Captors 2. Deliberate Hostage Takers
Religious Fanatics	
Criminals	1. Antisocial Personality Disorder/Trapped Criminal 2. Antisocial Personality Disorder/Kidnapper
Prison Inmates	1. Antisocial Personality Disorder
Combination	

Table 3

NUMBER OF *POLITICAL EXTREMIST* HOSTAGE TAKERS BY INCIDENT
1970-1974 INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: ATTRIBUTES OF TERRORIST EVENTS
DATABASE

<i>NUMBER OF HOSTAGE TAKERS</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>4</i>	<i>5 or more</i>
	n %	n %	n %	n %	n %
Hijacking	15 (45.5)	17 (56.7)	21 (50.0)	14 (36.8)	21 (25.3)
Kidnapping	3 (9.1)	8 (26.7)	11 (26.2)	16 (42.1)	41 (49.4)
Barricade	8 (24.2)	5 (16.7)	10 (23.8)	8 (21.1)	21 (25.3)
Total	33	30	42	38	83

Note. From The Hostage Response: An Examination of the U.S. Law Enforcement Practices Concerning Hostage Incidents (p. 107a), by W. B. Head, 1990, Doctoral Dissertation, State University of New York at Albany, Dissertation Abstracts International. Copyright 1990 by W. B. Head. Adapted with permission.

Table 4

CASUALTY RATES IN *POLITICAL EXTREMIST* HOSTAGE INCIDENTS
1970-1974 INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: ATTRIBUTES OF TERRORIST EVENTS
DATABASE

<i>CASUALTY RATE</i>	<i>0</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>4 or more</i>	<i>0 v 1 or more</i>
	n %	n %	n %	n %	n %	%
HOSTAGES WOUNDED						
Hijacking	66 (20.6)	4 (23.5)	6 (50)	1 (12.5)	10 (37.0)	76% v 24%
Kidnapping	220 (68.8)	10 (58.8)	4 (33.3)	5 (62.5)	3 (11.1)	91% v 9%
Barricade	34 (10.6)	3 (17.6)	2 (16.6)	2 (25.0)	14 (51.8)	62% v 38%
Total	320	17	12	8	27	83% v 17%
HOSTAGE TAKER WOUNDED						
Hijacking	77 (21.2)	8 (53.3)	2 (40.0)	2 (50.0)	0 (0.0)	87% v 13%
Kidnapping	237 (65.2)	2 (13.3)	1 (20.0)	2 (50.0)	0 (0.0)	98% v 2%
Barricade	49 (13.4)	5 (33.3)	2 (40.0)	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	88% v 12%
Total	363	15	5	4	0	94% v 6%
HOSTAGE TAKER KILLED						
Hijacking	75 (21.3)	7 (46.7)	3 (37.5)	2 (66.6)	2 (22.2)	84% v 16%
Kidnapping	234 (66.5)	5 (33.3)	1 (12.5)	0 (0.0)	2 (22.2)	97% v 3%
Barricade	43 (12.2)	3 (20.0)	4 (50.0)	1 (33.3)	5 (55.5)	77% v 23%
Total	352	15	8	3	9	91% v 9%
TOTAL DEATHS						
Hijacking	71 (22.7)	8 (24.2)	2 (15.3)	3 (50.0)	5 (23.8)	80% v 20%
Kidnapping	205 (65.0)	22 (66.6)	8 (61.5)	0 (0.0)	6 (28.6)	85% v 15%
Barricade	37 (11.9)	3 (9.1)	3 (23.1)	3 (50.0)	10 (47.6)	66% v 34%
Total	313	33	13	6	21	81% v 19%

Note. From The Hostage Response: An Examination of the U.S. Law Enforcement Practices Concerning Hostage Incidents (p. 108a), by W. B. Head, 1990, Doctoral Dissertation, State

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Table 5

HOSTAGE SCENE CHARACTERISTICS
1973-1982 HOSTAGE EVENT ANALYTIC DATABASE

<i>HOSTAGE SCENE</i>	<i>NUMBER OF INCIDENTS</i>
	n %
Home	164 (20.4)
Public place	125 (15.6)
Office, school, place of employment of the hostage	100 (12.5)
Transportation i.e., motor vehicle, aircraft, other transportation, embarkation area	282 (35.2)
Prison	64 (8.0)
Other/Unknown	66 (8.2)
Total	801

Note. From The Hostage Response: An Examination of the U.S. Law Enforcement Practices Concerning Hostage Incidents (p. 112a), by W. B. Head, 1990, Doctoral Dissertation, State University of New York at Albany, Dissertation Abstracts International. Copyright 1990 by W. B. Head. Adapted with permission.

Table 6

HOSTAGE CHARACTERISTICS**1973-1982 HOSTAGE EVENT ANALYTIC DATABASE**

<i>NUMBER OF HOSTAGES</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>3 or 4</i>	<i>5-10</i>	<i>10 or more</i>	<i>Unknown</i>
	301 (38%)	92 (11%)	68 (8%)	70 (9%)	184 (23%)	86 (11%)
<i>GENDER OF HOSTAGES</i>	<i>Male</i>	<i>Female</i>	<i>Male & Female</i>	<i>Unknown</i>		
	261 (33%)	146 (18%)	326 (41%)	68 (8%)		
<i>TYPE OF HOSTAGES</i>	<i>Government Employees</i>	<i>Comm/Bus. & Family</i>	<i>Bystander</i>	<i>Empl. & Bystander</i>	<i>Other</i>	<i>Unknown</i>
	59 (7%)	240 (30%)	148 (18%)	205 (26%)	102 (13%)	47 (6%)

Note. From The Hostage Response: An Examination of the U.S. Law Enforcement Practices Concerning Hostage Incidents (p. 114a), by W. B. Head, 1990, Doctoral Dissertation, State University of New York at Albany, Dissertation Abstracts International. Copyright 1990 by W. B. Head. Adapted with permission.

Table 7

HOSTAGE TAKER CHARACTERISTICS**1973-1982 HOSTAGE EVENT ANALYTIC DATABASE**

<i>Number of hostage takers</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>4</i>	<i>5 or more</i>	<i>Unknown</i>
	373 (47%)	123 (15%)	75 (9%)	54 (7%)	93 (12%)	83 (10%)
<i>Gender of hostage takers</i>	<i>Male</i>	<i>Female</i>	<i>Male & Female</i>	<i>Unknown</i>		
	635 (80%)	25 (3%)	82 (10%)	59 (7%)		
<i>Race of hostage takers</i>	<i>Black</i>	<i>Hispanic</i>	<i>Asian</i>	<i>Caucasian</i>	<i>Other</i>	<i>Unknown</i>
	35 (4%)	77 (10%)	41 (5%)	490 (61%)	41 (5%)	117 (15%)
<i>Age of hostage takers</i>	<i>Less than 20</i>	<i>20-29</i>	<i>30-49</i>	<i>50 & over</i>	<i>Mixed</i>	<i>Unknown</i>
	47 (6%)	152 (19%)	157 (20%)	18 (2%)	97 (12%)	330 (41%)
<i>Motive of hostage takers</i>	<i>Family Dispute</i>	<i>Unintentional</i>	<i>Political/ Publicity</i>	<i>Money</i>	<i>Other</i>	<i>Unknown</i>
	36 (4%)	30 (4%)	270 (33%)	181 (23%)	117 (15%)	102 (13%)
<i>Typology of hostage takers</i>	<i>Political Extremist/ Religious Fanatic</i>	<i>Criminal/ Prison Inmate</i>	<i>Emotionally Disturbed</i>	<i>Other</i>		
	165 (21%)	419 (52%)	147 (18%)	70 (9%)		

Note. From The Hostage Response: An Examination of the U.S. Law Enforcement Practices Concerning Hostage Incidents (p. 113b), by W. B. Head, 1990, Doctoral Dissertation, State University of New York at Albany, Dissertation Abstracts International. Copyright 1990 by W. B. Head. Adapted with permission.

Table 8

HOSTAGE INCIDENT DURATION**1973-1982 HOSTAGE EVENT ANALYTIC DATABASE**

<i>INCIDENT DURATION</i>	<i>NUMBER OF INCIDENTS</i>
	n (%)
24 hours or less	426 (53.2)
1-5 days	122 (15.2)
6 days or more	86 (10.7)
Unknown	167 (20.8)
Total	801

Note. From The Hostage Response: An Examination of the U.S. Law Enforcement Practices Concerning Hostage Incidents (p. 113a), by W. B. Head, 1990, Doctoral Dissertation, State University of New York at Albany, Dissertation Abstracts International. Copyright 1990 by W. B. Head. Adapted with permission.

Table 9

CASUALTY RATES IN HOSTAGE INCIDENTS**1973-1982 HOSTAGE EVENT ANALYTIC DATABASE**

<i>CASUALTY RATE</i>	<i>0</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>3 or more</i>	<i>Unknown</i>
	n %	n %	n %	n %	n %
Hostages wounded	672 (83)	71 (9)	21 (3)	29 (4)	8 (1)
Hostage taker wounded	746 (93)	34 (4)	6 (1)	10 (1)	5 (1)
Responding official wounded	765 (96)	12 (1)	7 (1)	12 (1)	5 (1)
Hostages killed	704 (87)	55 (7)	16 (2)	21 (3)	5 (1)
Hostage taker killed	703 (87)	71 (9)	7 (1)	15 (2)	5 (1)
Responding official killed	781 (98)	7 (1)	4 (0)	5 (1)	4 (0)

Note. From The Hostage Response: An Examination of the U.S. Law Enforcement Practices Concerning Hostage Incidents (p. 115a), by W. B. Head, 1990, Doctoral Dissertation, State University of New York at Albany, Dissertation Abstracts International. Copyright 1990 by W. B. Head. Adapted with permission.

Table 10

HOSTAGE SCENE CHARACTERISTICS**1973-1982 NEW YORK POLICE DEPARTMENT DATABASE**

<i>HOSTAGE SCENE</i>	<i>NUMBER OF INCIDENTS</i>
	n %
Home	55 (41)
Public place	39 (28)
Office, school, place of employment of the hostage	19 (14)
Transportation i.e., motor vehicle, aircraft, other transportation, embarkation area	10 (7)
Prison	1 (1)
Other/Unknown	12 (9)
Total	137

Note. From The Hostage Response: An Examination of the U.S. Law Enforcement Practices Concerning Hostage Incidents (p. 140a), by W. B. Head, 1990, Doctoral Dissertation, State University of New York at Albany, Dissertation Abstracts International. Copyright 1990 by W. B. Head. Adapted with permission.

Table 11

HOSTAGE CHARACTERISTICS

1973-1982 NEW YORK POLICE DEPARTMENT DATABASE

<i>NUMBER OF HOSTAGES</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>3 or 4</i>	<i>5-10</i>	<i>10 or more</i>	<i>Unknown</i>
	59 (43%)	35 (26%)	15 (11%)	13 (9%)	10 (5%)	8 (6%)
<i>GENDER OF HOSTAGES</i>	<i>Male</i>	<i>Female</i>	<i>Male & Female</i>	<i>Unknown</i>		
	43 (31%)	47 (35%)	37 (27%)	1 (7%)		
<i>TYPE OF HOSTAGES</i>	<i>Government Employees</i>	<i>Comm/Bus. & Family</i>	<i>Bystander</i>	<i>Empl. & Bystander</i>	<i>Other</i>	<i>Unknown</i>
	5 (4%)	52 (38%)	36 (26%)	14 (10%)	23 (17%)	7 (5%)

Note. From The Hostage Response: An Examination of the U.S. Law Enforcement Practices Concerning Hostage Incidents (p. 141c), by W. B. Head, 1990, Doctoral Dissertation, State University of New York at Albany, Dissertation Abstracts International. Copyright 1990 by W. B. Head. Adapted with permission.

Table 12

HOSTAGE TAKER CHARACTERISTICS**1973-1982 NEW YORK POLICE DEPARTMENT DATABASE**

<i>Number of hostage takers</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>4</i>	<i>5 or more</i>	<i>Unknown</i>
	75 (56%)	32 (23%)	14 (10%)	6 (4%)	7 (10%)	3 (2%)
<i>Gender of hostage takers</i>	<i>Male</i>	<i>Female</i>	<i>Male & Female</i>	<i>Unknown</i>		
	119 (87%)	7 (5%)	7 (5%)	4 (3%)		
<i>Race of hostage takers</i>	<i>Black</i>	<i>Hispanic</i>	<i>Asian</i>	<i>Caucasian</i>	<i>Other</i>	<i>Unknown</i>
	35 (26%)	14 (10%)	2 (1%)	47 (35%)	7 (5%)	32 (23%)
<i>Age of hostage takers</i>	<i>Less than 20</i>	<i>20-29</i>	<i>30-49</i>	<i>50 & over</i>	<i>Mixed</i>	<i>Unknown</i>
	13 (9%)	50 (37%)	34 (26%)	2 (1%)	10 (7%)	28 (20%)
<i>Motive of hostage takers</i>	<i>Family Dispute</i>	<i>Unintentional</i>	<i>Political/ Publicity</i>	<i>Money</i>	<i>Other</i>	<i>Unknown</i>
	22 (16%)	8 (6%)	14 (10%)	53 (39%)	22 (16%)	18 (13%)
<i>Typology of hostage takers</i>	<i>Political Extremist/ Religious Fanatic</i>	<i>Criminal/ Prison Inmate</i>	<i>Emotionally Disturbed</i>	<i>Other</i>		
	4 (3%)	78 (58%)	35 (26%)	18 (13%)		

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Table 13

HOSTAGE INCIDENT DURATION**1973-1982 NEW YORK POLICE DEPARTMENT DATABASE**

<i>INCIDENT DURATION</i>	<i>NUMBER OF INCIDENTS</i>
	n (%)
24 hours or less	102 (74.5)
1-5 days	14 (10.2)
6 days or more	5 (3.6)
Unknown	16 (11.6)
Total	137

Note. From The Hostage Response: An Examination of the U.S. Law Enforcement Practices Concerning Hostage Incidents (p. 141a), by W. B. Head, 1990, Doctoral Dissertation, State University of New York at Albany, Dissertation Abstracts International. Copyright 1990 by W. B. Head. Adapted with permission.

Table 14

CASUALTY RATES IN HOSTAGE INCIDENTS**1973-1982 NEW YORK POLICE DEPARTMENT DATABASE**

<i>CASUALTY RATE</i>	<i>0</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>2 or more</i>	<i>Unknown</i>
	n %	n %	n %	n %
Hostages wounded	111 (81)	21 (15)	4 (3)	1 (1)
Hostage taker wounded	128 (94)	8 (6)	0 (0)	1 (1)
Responding official wounded	130 (95)	6 (4)	1 (1)	0 (0)
Hostages killed	126 (91)	9 (7)	1 (1)	15 (1)
Hostage taker killed	125 (91)	10 (7)	1 (1)	1 (1)
Responding official killed	125 (91)	10 (7)	1 (1)	1 (0)

Note. From The Hostage Response: An Examination of the U.S. Law Enforcement Practices Concerning Hostage Incidents (p. 143b), by W. B. Head, 1990, Doctoral Dissertation, State University of New York at Albany, Dissertation Abstracts International. Copyright 1990 by W. B. Head. Adapted with permission.

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HOSTAGE NEGOTIATOR'S COMPUTER DATABASE

Because there is no national systematic collection and review of hostage incidents, it is incumbent upon local law enforcement authorities to develop and maintain their own hostage incident databases. With the development of such databases, local hostage recovery programs are better able to obtain relevant information regarding hostage incidents in their community and analyze negotiation style and effectiveness. Dr. Call has developed a computer database model for use by hostage recovery programs. Those interested in obtaining further information regarding the HOSTAGE NEGOTIATOR'S COMPUTER DATABASE are invited to contact Dr. Call at 5100 N. Brookline, Suite 700, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, 73112.